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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
Macroeconomics and Public Finances: The worst is yet to come 
 
• The Great Recession of 2008-9 caused a big drop in UK national output, perhaps a 
permanent 5% drop in GDP. The average household’s wealth fell from £375,000 to 
£330,000 between 2007 and 2008 alone. But unemployment, currently 8%, has been low 
compared with previous recessions. 
 
• From 1997 to the eve of the recession, Labour boosted public spending by 1.2% of GDP 
and raised taxes by 2.3% of GDP, reducing the structural deficit. But since 2007, the 
recession blasted a hole in the public finances and, without action, the deficit would 
remain unsustainably high at around 7-9% of GDP.  
 
• Public sector net debt is currently £890 billion. Under Labour’s plans to cut spending and 
raise taxes, this will peak at 76% of GDP in 2014, then decline to around 70% by 2018, 
up from a recent average of around 40%.  
 
• The UK’s long-term structural fiscal challenges notwithstanding, market prices do not 
indicate neither an imminent Greek-type fiscal crisis in the short run nor extreme 
inflation. But market appetite for gilts may decline if current debt trends continue and 
when short-term interest rates begin to rise.  
 
• All the political parties are signed up to major cuts in spending and increases in taxes to 
reduce the deficit, but none have put forward a comprehensive plan to meet the challenge. 
The manifestos are broadly similar with the Conservatives planning to put a slightly 
greater emphasis on spending cuts. 
 
• How soon can we start credibly reducing the deficit without risking the recovery? The 
Conservatives propose to cut government spending by £6 billion more than Labour’s 
plans this year. Regardless of whether these are really ‘efficiency savings’, this still 
withdraws demand from the economy. This means spending cuts in real terms of 5.1% in 
all departments except health and overseas aid. 
 
• The Conservatives would have a lower increase in National Insurance after 2011 (costing 
£6 billion) and the Liberal Democrats would increase personal allowances (costing £16.8 
billion). These policies would further raise the deficit unless there are offsetting cuts in 
spending or increases in taxation. 
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Introduction 
 
The economy seemed to have had a near death experience during the Great Recession of 
2008-2009. This Election Analysis describes where we are now in terms of macroeconomic 
performance and the impact on the public finances. We then look at the policy options, 
focusing on debt reduction and economic recovery, and compare the parties’ positions.  
 
All main parties are promising huge cuts in spending and tax increases, but they are not really 
specifying where these will come from. The debates have focused on the narrower question 
of the speed with which deficit reductions will kick in, which are relatively minor. This raises 
the danger that the public will resist the unpleasant medicine that is coming in the next few 
years.  
 
This analysis starts with where we are now, then addresses the future of public debt before 
analysing the policy positions of the major parties. 
 
 
Where are we now? 
 
A permanent fall in GDP? 
From the early 1990s to 2007, the UK economy had a very smooth and buoyant ride: GDP 
grew steadily at around 3% a year, house prices grew at an average of 10% and 
unemployment fell from 10% to 5%. Although share prices fell sharply between 2000 and 
2002, the effects on the rest of the economy were mild. 
 
In the middle of 2007, these trends suddenly reversed. Compared with the summer of 2007, 
GDP has fallen by 4%, unemployment has risen to 8%, house prices have fallen by 15% and 
share prices have fallen by 20%. 
 
Typically, recovery from a recession is sufficiently strong so that GDP and other variables 
entirely make up the lost ground and return to their earlier trajectories. There are some 
concerns that this may not occur in the aftermath of the 2008-10 recession. The 2010 Budget 
predicts a 5% permanent drop in output. 
 
Charts showing historical and projected GDP are shaped like lightning bolts: a downward zag 
during 2008 and 2009, returning to an upward zig that never meets the old path (see Figure 
1). Concerns about output loss are based on historical evidence that financial crises can cause 
permanent effects on GDP. But the magnitude is highly uncertain; for example, the OECD 
estimates a loss of 2-4% and the IMF a loss of 10%. 
 
Unemployment up, but by less than expected 
Figure 2 shows unemployment rates and GDP growth since 1974 (recessions in grey). 
Although the latest figures show we appear to be out of recession, the cumulative fall in 
output during the most recent recession has been greater than in the 1980s and 1990s. But 
unemployment has risen by less and still stands well below the peaks of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Part of this may be due to an improvement in the functioning of the labour market with a 
more effective Employment Service and programmes like the New Deal.1  
                                                 
1 See CEP Election Analysis on jobs and youth unemployment 
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/news/year.asp?yyyy=2010#2015) 
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Figure 1: GDP, historical and projections by the Bank of England 
 
Source: Bank of England Inflation Report, February 2010 
 
 
Figure 2: UK unemployment and annual GDP growth rate, 1974-2010 
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Source: ILO quarterly unemployment rate for 16 and over from 1974q1 to 2010q1 – the last point is the rolling 
average for 12/2009-02/2010. ONS GDP from 1974q1 to 2010q1: annual GDP growth – the last point is the 
GDP preliminary estimate for the first quarter 2010. 
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Assets down, savings up  
The recession hit the UK harder than some other countries because asset prices (house prices 
and shares) were overvalued, household debt was particularly high and the financial sector is 
very large – employing one in five of the workforce and responsible for more than half of the 
jobs increase since 1995. 
 
The UK’s private savings ratio (the proportion of private disposable income that is not spent) 
fell from 12% in the early 1990s to zero in 2008, but jumped to 9% in 2009.2 An important 
reason for the decline in savings rates was the growth in house prices. Household net worth 
fell from £7.5 trillion to £6.6 trillion between 2007 and 2008, which is a fall from £375,000 
to £330,000 – more than a year’s income.  
 
External imbalances and sterling 
With low savings rates and stable investment of around 15% of GDP, the boom was 
accompanied and funded by a current account deficit. For the past 20 years, the UK ran trade 
deficits most years ranging around 3% of GDP in recent years (see Figure 3). Historical 
experience shows that deep recessions caused by financial crises tend to end with export 
booms.3 While sterling significantly weakened during the crisis and the current account 
deficit initially narrowed to 1.5% of GDP in 2008, it then widened to 2% in 2009 and the 
trade deficit has widened further in the first few months of 2010. 
 
Figure 3: Current account deficit as a percentage of GDP (bars, left-hand scale) and 
Effective Exchange Rate Index (line, right-hand scale) 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
‐4.0
‐3.5
‐3.0
‐2.5
‐2.0
‐1.5
‐1.0
‐0.5
0.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 
Source: Bank of England and IMF World Economic Outlook 
                                                 
2 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/tsdataset.asp?vlnk=221&More=N&All=Y 
3 IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), April 2009  
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Public finances: deficits and debt 
 
From 1997 to 2007, the public deficit was reduced by Labour by about 1.1 percentage points 
of GDP. Government spending increased dramatically after 2000, raising the share of public 
spending in GDP to 41.1%, an increase of 1.2 percentage points. These have improved 
outcomes in health, education and crime.4 But Labour also increased tax revenues by 2.3 
percentage points to 38.7% of GDP.5  
 
Since 2007, tax revenues have followed the zigzag pattern of GDP but government spending 
has continued along a rising path. This has opened up a gap between expenditure and revenue 
equalling around 10% of GDP (see Figure 4). 
 
In thinking about the current fiscal deficit, three factors are important: 
 
First, during recessions, tax revenues decline and government expenditures rise due to 
‘automatic stabilisers’. Unemployment benefits and other forms of social spending tend to 
increase while revenues decline more than proportionally due to the progressivity of the tax 
code. This automatically re-adjusts as the economy recovers. 
 
Second, governments may increase expenditures and reduce tax rates through temporary 
discretionary policies, aimed at counteracting the recession or limiting its social costs. This 
also reflects a temporary component of the deficit insofar as the discretionary measures 
undertaken are truly temporary. The reduction in the VAT rate has already been reversed. 
The deferral of business taxes has not only been reversed, but will contribute to added 
revenues in 2010-12. On the other hand, the discretionary increases in expenditures involved 
across-the-board increases in public expenditures that may be more difficult politically to 
reverse. 
 
Figure 4: Budget spending and receipts 
 
Source: HM Treasury. Current spending and public sector total receipts, in £ billion 
 
Third, a permanent decline in output causes a permanent decrease in tax receipts, requiring a 
commensurate decrease in expenditures, if long-term budget balance is to be achieved.  
 
                                                 
4 See CEP Election Analyses in each area (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEPEA) 
5 HM Treasury, Public Finances Databank, March 2010 
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This has the most significant long-term impact, as it implies a permanent increase in the 
deficit. Estimates of the 2009-10 structural deficit range from 7.8% to 9%, second only to 
Ireland among advanced economies.6 
 
On the other hand, public sector wages have historically matched the trends of private sector 
wages and are therefore likely to decline in upcoming years. Thus the structural deficit may 
overstate the actual fiscal difficulties that the UK will face. 
 
The main consequence of high deficits is an increase in public indebtedness. The recent 
sequence of large government deficits has been funded by borrowing from financial markets, 
thereby increasing total government debt. During its first decade in power, the Labour 
government kept net public debt below 40% of GDP, but it is now projected to increase to 
76% of GDP by 2014 (see Figure 5). Only around one tenth of that increase is due to 
financial sector interventions; most is due to the permanent fall in tax revenue while 
government expenditure has continued to rise.  
 
There has been considerable argument over whether the UK will suffer because of its large 
debt and how urgently the government should attempt to close the deficit. The answer turns 
largely on how financial markets perceive the future credibility of the UK in repaying this 
debt. 
 
In 2009, the UK had the second highest budget deficit among the members of the G7 (11% of 
GDP; the United States was first with 12%). In contrast, net debt has remained relatively low 
(44% of GDP in 2009) and even in 2014, when UK debt is projected to hit 76%, it will have 
much less debt than Italy or Japan (at 125% and 143% respectively).7  
 
Perhaps because of this, at present markets seem to be fairly sanguine: the government is 
currently able to borrow for 10 years at 4%, a low interest rate by historical standards and a 
rate no different from what has been available to the government since the mid-1990s. 
Spreads between interest rates on UK bonds relative to US or German bonds are 
insignificant.8 
 
Short-term interest rates are significantly lower than they have been at any time in recent 
history due to the effectively zero short-term interest rate set by the Bank of England. 
Inflation expectations have also been low during the crisis, implying limited market concern 
that the real size of government debt will be reduced through the use of inflation. But 
inflation expectations have risen and currently stand at close to 3.5%.  
 
There is some economic evidence that deficits affect yields on government debt even after 
controlling for the total stock of debt,9 as deficits tend to be persistent and politically difficult 
to unwind. The IMF estimates that the UK government will need to run structural budget 
surpluses of 5% throughout the 2020s to bring the public debt stock down to 60% of GDP. 
This would require a 12.8 percentage point adjustment in the structural deficit as a proportion 
of GDP in the upcoming decade – one of the largest fiscal adjustments in recent history.10 
 
                                                 
6 Estimates from IMF (2009), and the 2009 Pre-Budget Report 
7 Data from the IMF’s WEO, October 2009 
8 See Figure 6 in IMF (2009) 
9 IMF (2009)  
10 Table 9 in IMF (2009)  
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Figure 5: Net public debt, historical and projections (percentage of GDP) 
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Source: HM Treasury Public Finance Database  
 
Another potential required adjustment is in the maturity of public debt. The maturity of 
outstanding debt has shortened with short-maturity gilts now comprising close to 20% of 
gross public debt, compared with 15% in the recent past. This may reflect the Treasury’s 
desire to take advantage of low short-term interest rates. But modest increases in interest rates 
could significantly increase the cost of maintaining this level of debt.  
 
 
Policy options and party proposals  
 
The medium term: To the end of the next parliament and beyond 
In the 2009 and 2010 Budgets, Labour announced long-term plans to resolve the deficit by (a) 
halving capital expenditure between 2009 and 2012; (b) reducing general departmental 
funding by 2% a year from April 2011 (compared with historical growth of around 4%); and 
(c) from April 2011, introducing a 50% income tax bracket on earnings exceeding £150,000 
and restricting tax allowances for those over £100,000. Labour also announced a public wage 
freeze for high-income public employees. 
 
The Conservatives have proposed11 (a) a one-year public pay freeze in 2011; (b) bringing 
forward the date at which the state pension age starts to rise to 66 to no earlier than 2016 for 
men and 2020 for women; (c) stopping tax credits to families with incomes over £50,000; (d) 
cutting spending on Child Trust Funds for all but the poorest third of families and families 
with disabled children; and (e) balancing the structural current budget by the end of the 
forecasting horizon (2015-16). 
 
A more detailed analysis of the parties’ specific proposals and other deficit reduction options 
is in Table 1. There is substantial overlap in the macroeconomic policies of all parties: all are 
                                                 
11 http://media.conservatives.s3.amazonaws.com/manifesto/cpmanifesto2010_hires.pdf, p.8 
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proposing stringent cuts to the deficit. The government is proposing to stablise the debt to 
GDP ratio in 2016/17 whereas the Conservatives say they will do it a year earlier by 2015/16. 
The government is proposing to split the deficit reduction one third in tax rises and two thirds 
in spending cuts, whereas the Conservatives would do one fifth in taxes and four fifths in 
spending cuts.  
 
These plans are not specific enough to be credible. The Liberal Democrats have identified 
more concrete savings (such as not replacing Trident) but even these amount to only £6.5 
billion. They have also pledged to increase personal allowances to £10,000, which would 
give away £16.8 billion in 2011/12. This would be paid for by various other tax measures, 
such as ‘anti-avoidance’ measures, which realists would argue are highly unlikely to work. 
 
The short run: what happens over the next year? 
Even though most pain has been deferred until after the election, the government has started 
to tighten the fiscal belt this year, for example, by increasing taxes on those over £100,000, 
withdrawing the VAT reduction and reducing capital expenditure. Some economists have 
voiced concerns that the required adjustment in the structural deficit is so large that some 
immediate measures must be taken to lower the deficit. Others worry that starting the cuts too 
soon (say in 2010/11) could push the UK back into a recession.12 
 
The Conservatives have been arguing for swifter action to reduce the deficit, but the concrete 
measures proposed amount to a reduction of only £6 billion in spending in 2010/11 compared 
with Labour. On top of this, they propose to restrict the planned increases in employer’s 
National Insurance from 2011, which will lead to lower tax revenues of £6 billion. The magic 
circle is squared through pointing to an additional £12 billion of ‘efficiency’ savings. The 
government itself has pencilled in £11 billion of these for 2011, but we should be sceptical – 
efficiencies are elusive and hard to achieve.  
 
In any case, a reduction of spending remains just that, whether achieved ‘painlessly’ through 
efficiency gains or more painfully from a fall in the quality of public services. It will reduce 
demand and endanger the recovery if it really is so fragile. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
There are initial signs of recovery from the deep recession of 2008 to 2009. But the recovery 
may be slow and there is still no sign of a significant reversal in the current account deficits 
that the UK has run for the past two decades. These problems may be compounded by large 
deficits and the medium-term challenge of public debt reduction. 
 
All parties have been vociferous in their rhetoric on public debt reduction. Deficit and debt 
reduction will be painful, with the agony unequally distributed across the electorate. The 
parties have articulated specific targets and piecemeal measures to address the public debt 
challenge, but no party has put forward a comprehensive plan to address the structural deficit 
challenges that are likely to be central to the economic policy agenda of the elected 
government. 
April 2010 
                                                 
12 For example, see the exchange of letters between 80 economists in the Sunday Times (13 February 2010) and 
the Financial Times (19 February 2010). 
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For further information 
Contact Alan Manning on 020-7955-6078 (a.manning@lse.ac.uk); John Van Reenen on 020-
7955-7049 (j.vanreenen@lse.ac.uk); Ethan Ilzetzki on 020-7955-7510 (e.ilzetzki@lse.ac.uk) 
or Romesh Vaitilingam on 07768-661095 (romesh@vaitilingam.com). This briefing was 
written by Tom Cunningham and Ethan Ilzetzki; Barbara Richter provided research 
assistance. 
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Table 1: Dealing with the deficit?  
Policy Party proposals Potential impact 
 
INCREASING TAXES 
 
Increasing taxes 
on high-income 
earnings 
From April 2010, there is a new 50% 
income tax bracket, restricted tax 
allowances on pension contributions for 
people earning above £150,000 and 
withdrawal of personal allowances for 
those earning above £100,000. The 
other parties will keep these measures in 
place. 
The 50% income tax bracket is projected to 
yield revenues of approximately 0.1% of GDP 
and thus will not bring a significant long-run 
decrease in the deficit.13 
National 
Insurance 
From April 2011, Labour will increase 
employer and employee National 
Insurance (NI) by 1p. This is combined 
with an increase in the point at which 
lower earners pay NI to  
 £1,170, meaning that low earners will 
pay less NI. The Conservatives will 
restrict the increase in NI so there will 
be less NI levied on workers earning 
under £45,400. 
Labour plans will raise about £6.3 billion, just 
about all of which will be lost under 
Conservative plans.  
Employers’ NI will translate through to lower 
wages.  
Personal 
allowances 
The Liberal Democrats will raise the 
income tax personal allowance to 
£10,000 
This would cost about £16.8 billion in 2011/12 
Increasing the 
VAT rate or 
broadening the 
VAT base 
While VAT is a popular tax among 
economists, due to its relatively non-
distortionary nature, neither party has 
proposed an increase in VAT.  
The VAT rate of 17.5% is below the European 
level of 19.5%, indicating that tax increases on 
this front are feasible. A 3.5% increase in the 
VAT would raise around 1% of GDP in tax 
revenues.14 Broadening the VAT base and 
eliminating exemptions could increase 
revenues by up to 3% of GDP a year. 
                                                 
13 2009 Budget 
14 IFS (2010) 
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Policy Party proposals Potential impact 
Cutting tax 
credits 
The Conservatives have proposed 
stopping tax credits for households 
earning in excess of £50,000.  
This is a relatively progressive way to increase 
tax revenues. But it is likely to yield less than 
£100 million of new revenues.15 
 
Bank taxes 
The Liberal Democrats will put an 
additional 10% tax on UK banks 
(raising £2.2 billion), the Conservatives 
a £1 billion levy. Labour wants an 
international deal on a financial 
transactions tax. 
Bank taxes levied solely in the UK (as the 
opposition parties propose) could lead to banks 
relocating away from the UK. Crude bank 
taxes by themselves will do little to deal with 
the problem of financial regulation that caused 
the crisis – see CEP Election Analysis on 
Financial Regulation 
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/ea011.pdf). 
 
 
 
Other taxes 
 
 
 
The Liberal Democrats will (i) reform 
air passenger duty and introduce taxes 
for domestic flights (£3.3 billion); (ii) 
introduce 1% tax on domestic property 
values over £2 million (‘mansion tax’) – 
£1.7 billion; (iii) reduce capital gains 
allowances (£1.9 billion). 
 
 
CUTTING GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
 
Public sector 
wages  
Labour and the Conservatives have 
proposed public sector pay freezes. The 
Conservatives have also proposed 
capping public sector pensions for 
public employees with earnings in 
excess of £50,000. The Liberal 
Democrats have proposed a £400 pay 
raise cap for all public employees. 
When public expenditures cuts are necessary 
during recessions, public wage freezes or cuts 
are particularly attractive options. They help 
cut government expenditure in real terms but 
have more limited macroeconomic and social 
costs relative to cutting public good provision 
or public investment. They may lower the 
fiscal deficit with a limited reduction in the 
provision of public goods; at the same time, 
they do not add workers to the unemployment 
pool and public workers are less likely to leave 
public service for private sector jobs. The long-
run fiscal benefit of such cuts depends on 
whether they cause a permanent decline in 
public wages. Labour’s wage freeze is 
projected to reduce expenditures cumulatively 
by 0.2% of GDP, which has a negligible effect 
on long-run debt and will only have a small 
and temporary impact on the budget deficit.  
Slowing the 
growth of public 
expenditures 
Labour has proposed cutting 
departmental funding by 2% a year in 
real terms in 2011 to 2014 and halving 
public investments. The Conservatives 
have proposed cutting spending on 
Child Trust Funds for all but the poorest 
third of families and families with 
disabled children. Liberal Democrats 
have proposed to end government 
payments into Child Trust Funds. 
Labour’s proposal could have a significant 
impact on public debt, but lacks specifics in 
how such radical cuts will be achieved. Drastic 
cuts in public investments could have an 
impact on economic growth in the medium 
term. 
                                                 
15 Author’s estimate: the Treasury estimates that approximately 153,500 with incomes above £50,000 receive 
the Child Tax Credit, some of whom would still receive under the Conservatives’ plan. They receive less than 
the standard rate of £545, putting an upper bound of £82 million on savings due to this proposal.  
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Policy Party proposals Potential impact 
Structural policies 
 
Increasing the 
retirement age 
The Turner review, overseen by the 
Blair government in 2004, proposes 
increasing women’s retirement age to 
65 by 2020 and raise both sexes’ 
retirement age to 66 in 2026.16 The 
Conservatives have proposed bringing 
forward the date at which the state 
pension age starts to rise to 66, to no 
earlier than 2016 for men and 2020 for 
women.  
It is estimated that increasing the full pension 
age to 68 for men and women by 2030 would 
give (cumulative) savings of 0.6% of GDP. As 
this reform is more ambitious than proposed by 
either party, it gives an upper bound to the 
potential revenues that are available through 
pension reform. 
 
BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS 
 
Fiscal rules 
versus fiscal 
committees 
Both parties have considered 
institutional arrangements that might 
help control deficits in the future and 
serve as a check on the Treasury in the 
budgetary process. Labour’s approach 
has been ‘rule-based’ in that it attempts 
to limit future deficits through a form of 
fiscal rule. In February, Labour passed a 
Fiscal Stability Act, which updated the 
draft Code for Fiscal Stability.17 The 
Conservatives have instead proposed an 
institutional arrangement in the form of 
a Budgetary Responsibility Committee, 
which would produce medium-term 
budget forecasts and assess the long-
term sustainability of the public 
finances.18 
There is limited economic research on the 
relative advantages of rules and committees in 
the fiscal process. IMF research has shown that 
fiscal rules have been helpful in fiscal 
consolidation, but do not compare rules to the 
alternative proposal.19 The common argument 
in favour of a fiscal council is that it allows 
some discretion (based ideally on professional 
expertise rather than political considerations) in 
reacting to new conditions. Another argument 
is that it is very common for fiscal rules to be 
violated.20 Proponents of institutional 
arrangements argue that the force of the moral 
suasion of a fiscal council exceeds the quasi-
legal force of a fiscal rule. Proponents of a 
fiscal rule argue that it provides a clear target 
and that an institution like a fiscal council is 
likely to be subject to political pressure.  
In practical terms, the devil is likely to be in 
the details. The effectiveness of a fiscal 
committee depends on its institutional 
structure, authority, and degree of 
independence. The effectiveness of a fiscal rule 
depends on enforcement mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
16 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/oct/06/retirement-age-david-cameron 
17 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/fiscal_stability_draft_code.pdf 
18 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8b4fa40e-fa4c-11de-beed-00144feab49a,s01=1.html 
19 IMF (2009)  
20 Think of the case of Greece: officially it was bound by the eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact, which limits 
deficits to 3% of GDP, but in practice Greece ran deficits in excess of 9% and has violated the terms of the pact 
every year 
